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THE BITTER SIDE OF SWEET SIXTEEN: WHY




There is something illustrious about the age sixteen. Immortalized by
Hollywood in films like Sixteen Candles, television shows such as MTV's
"My Super Sweet 16," and ample other pop culture references, turning
sixteen is a milestone in a young person's life. Perhaps the fascination with
this birthday stems from the amusing combination of youth and budding
maturity as teenagers begin their ascent into adulthood while still
struggling with parental and societal restrictions. Turning sixteen is often
associated with newfound freedoms and exciting privileges, such as driving
or a later curfew. Of course, there remain a lot of things a sixteen-year-old
cannot do, but this first step into adulthood is exhilarating nonetheless. In
New York, however, this milestone birthday means a lot more than sweet
sixteen celebrations and car keys; it also means criminal liability for one's
actions.
Consider the following hypothetical. John and Derek are both star
athletes at their local high school with promising futures playing college
soccer at the school of their choice. John is a sixteen-year-old junior and
Derek is a thirteen-year-old freshman. The varsity soccer program recently
recruited both boys to play on its team because of their extreme talent.
They get along well at first, but as the season progresses their relationship
becomes hostile. John thinks freshmen should not be allowed to play on
varsity teams and Derek thinks John refuses to pass him the ball because
Derek's talent is intimidating. After a particularly crushing loss to their
rival high school, John and Derek begin arguing on the field about why
their team lost the game. The verbal altercation turns physical as the boys
punch one another repeatedly. Eventually, a police officer pulls John and
* J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Fairfield University, 2010.
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Derek apart and each boy is bloody and swollen. The police officer files an
incident report and the boys wait to hear what will happen to them,
unaware their respective ages will play a key factor in the outcome.
John, being sixteen, is prosecuted as an adult in criminal court for
assault. He appears in criminal court and meets with the Assistant District
Attorney. John's parents are not present for this meeting because John is
legally considered an adult for the criminal proceeding. He decides to plead
guilty to the charges in order to receive the Assistant District Attorney's
offer of one-year probation. John listens as the Assistant District Attorney
and the judge ask questions, but the courtroom is loud and crowded, he is
scared and just wants to go home. Before he knows it, the judge bangs his
gavel and the next case is called. John now has a criminal record with a
conviction for assault, a fact he will need to report on every college
application next fall. He also learns many of the colleges that were
previously scouting him to play on their team are no longer interested and
his dream of playing professional soccer may be thwarted.
Derek, being thirteen, is prosecuted as a juvenile in Family Court. His
parents are permitted, and even encouraged, to be a part of his proceeding.
The judge explains each step of the proceeding to Derek and invites him to
ask questions if he is confused. Derek is ordered to complete one hundred
hours of community service, but walks out of court without a criminal
record and his future intact.
In New York, a sixteen-year-old is automatically prosecuted as an adult
for all criminal conduct, but in other proceedings, like those involving
neglectl or status offenses, 2 the law treats sixteen-year-olds as children. 3
Sixteen-year-olds cannot consume alcohol, purchase tobacco or a lottery
ticket, enlist in the army, or even vote, but under New York law they are
held criminally responsible for their actions. The New York legislature
enacted many of these laws to protect children who lack the maturity to
make these important decisions, but this raises the question: if the State has
such a strong interest in protecting sixteen-year-olds from making
potentially dangerous choices, why does it fail to protect them in the
aftermath of these choices when teenagers need protection the most?
This Note addresses the need for New York to increase its jurisdictional
I Neglect proceedings refer to actions against a child's parent for neglect; however, a child is
defined as anyone under the age of eighteen.
2 Status offenses are behaviors that are legal for the general population, but illegal for a certain
class of people. For example, it is illegal for a sixteen-year-old to consume alcohol, but it is perfectly
legal for a twenty-one-old to do so.
3 Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 30 PACE L. REV. 1061, 1074
(2010).
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age limit to prosecute juveniles as adults in criminal court from sixteen to
eighteen. It proposes a compromise that recognizes emerging psychological
findings but retains retributivist values and political practicality essential to
the criminal justice system. Specifically, to ensure that children receive
adequate protection under the law, New York should prosecute all
individuals under the age of eighteen in Family Court, remove only
extreme cases at the Family Court's discretion, and expand the sentencing
power of the Family Court while increasing its jurisdiction from age
twenty-one to twenty-five.
Part 1I discusses recent psychological findings on juvenile cognitive
development that make New York's jurisdictional age limit unfair to
teenagers. Part III outlines the creation and development of the juvenile
justice system on a national and statewide level. This part discusses both
societal factors that contributed to the formation of the juvenile courts and
the current New York transfer law itself. Part IV will address the need to
change the transfer law, and why prior justifications for the New York
juvenile transfer laws no longer apply today. Notably, juvenile crime rates
have decreased over the past decade and advances in psychology
demonstrate that juveniles have an inherently different level of culpability
than adults. This part will also address why the current proposed
amendments to New York's juvenile transfer laws are inadequate to protect
teenagers. Part V proposes New York amend its juvenile transfer laws by
increasing the age of criminal liability from sixteen to eighteen. All
juveniles should be prosecuted in Family Court, removing only extreme
cases upon petition by the District Attorney and subject to the Family
Court's approval. Additionally, New York should expand the Family
Court's sentencing power by removing sentencing maximums and
increasing its jurisdiction from age twenty-one to twenty-five.
I. THE REALITY OF JUVENILE TRANSFERS: NEW FINDINGS ABOUT THE
TEENAGE BRAIN
It is well established that teenagers are different from adults. As
compared to adults, young people have trouble making decisions, take
more risks, and seem to rarely consider the consequences of their actions.
While any parent or teacher could have told you this from experience
alone, recent developments in psychology provide an explanation for this
difference in behavior.
This section discusses recent psychological findings that demonstrate
juveniles differ from adults in their ability to use logic, reason, make
2014]
264 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGH7S & ECONOMJCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:2
decisions, and analyze risks for a variety of reasons. Part A will explain the
recent psychological findings with respect to juvenile brain development
including structural changes, hormonal changes, and external influences.
Part B will highlight the impact of these findings on the law's treatment of
juveniles.
A. A Closer Look at the Teenage Brain
Advances in scientific research, largely attributable to new methods,
including the functional MRI,4 have revealed juveniles differ from adults in
two distinct ways that have a profound impact on their behavior: first, a
juvenile's brain is structurally underdeveloped, even at age sixteen or
seventeen, as compared to an adult's brain, and second, the processes of a
juvenile brain's functioning are distinguishable from that of an adult.
a. Structural Changes
The juvenile brain boasts a number of structural differences from an
adult brain. Recent estimates state the human brain finishes developing
close to age twenty-five. 5 Previously, scientists believed the human brain
was fully mature by age twelve,6 but new research indicates the brain
undergoes a second wave of growth in the teen years. 7 During this time the
amount of gray matter 8 peaks and thins to create connections within the
brain.9 Over the years the connections used most frequently become
permanent, while others disappear.' 0 These connections create an intricate
communication system using messengers called neurons to transmit signals
from the brain to the body. 1 These processes speed up as white matter 12
4 See Brief for the American Medical Association et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent
at 10-11, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2007) (No. 03-633).
5 Michelle Haddad, Catching Up: The Need for New York State to Amend its Juvenile Offender
Law to Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional and Normative National Trends Over the Last Three
Decades, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLY & ETHICS J. 455,481 (2009).
6 Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick, TIME (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,994126,00.html.
7 Seeid.
8 See Brief for the American Medical Association et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 19, Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412) ("Gray matter, which comprises
the outer surfaces of the brain, is composed of cells called neurons that perform the brain's tasks, such
as the higher functions that are carried out in the prefrontal cortex.").
9 See Wallis, supra note 6.
10 See id.
I1 See id.
12 See Brief for the American Psychological Association et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 26-27, Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412) ("[White matter is] the
tissue that forms pathways among different parts of the brain ....").
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thickens with myelin sheaths that accelerate communication. 13 As teens
establish these neurological connections and develop the ability to utilize
them faster and more efficiently, their cognitive abilities improve.
During this time, juveniles experience the most growth in areas that
impact decision-making and risk-taking behavior. The brain is organized
into different parts and each part controls certain actions. Teenage brains
develop the most in the pre-frontal cortex, parietal lobes, and temporal
lobes.14 The pre-frontal cortex controls our executive-functions such as
planning, judgment, controlling impulses, and foreseeing the consequences
of our actions. 15 This part of the brain finishes developing around age
twenty-one.16 The parietal lobes integrate information from different parts
of the brain such as auditory, tactile, and visual stimuli to make sense of
this information and create one larger picture. 17 This part of the brain
finishes developing in the mid-teen years.18 The temporal lobes control
language and emotions' 9 and finish developing around age sixteen.20 As
these parts of the brain develop, juveniles enhance their capacity to use
logic and reason in their decision-making and increase their ability to
control their actions.
b. Hormonal Changes
In addition to rapid brain development, teenagers also undergo drastic
hormonal changes that influence their behavior. Particularly, increases in
dopamine and sex hormones, like estrogen and testosterone, encourage
teens to engage in risky pleasure-seeking behaviors. 21 These behaviors can
range from simple decisions, like choosing to watch television instead of
doing homework, to more dangerous behavior like experimenting with
drugs or engaging in unprotected sex. Dopamine is strongly linked to
reward seeking and motivation 22 while sex hormones mainly influence
13 Wallis, supra note 6.
14 See id.; Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teen Brain, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 27, 2000),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2000/02/27/getting-inside-a-teen-brain.html.
15 Wallis, supra note 6.
16 Haddad, supra note 5, at 478.
17 See Begley, supra note 14.
18 See Haddad, supra note 5, at 480.
19 Begley, supra note 14.
20 Haddad, supra note 5, at 480.
21 See Wallis, supra note 6.
22 Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision Making: Reduced Culpability in the Criminal Justice
System and Recognition of Capability in Other Legal Contexts, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 375,
378 (2011).
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mood and excitability.2 3 This influx of new hormones combined with the
underdeveloped pre-frontal cortex (which controls judgment and impulse-
control) makes juveniles more likely to choose risky reward seeking
activities where adults would choose more rational behaviors. 24 As young
people develop into mature adults, they become accustomed to processing
these hormones and the pre-frontal cortex establishes the necessary
connections to resist such impulses and choose safer behaviors, but until
then teens face a difficult challenge in controlling their behavior.
c. External Influences
Juvenile behavior is also largely influenced by external sources. One
major influence is peer pressure.2 5 Teens engage in a variety of behaviors
to conform to peer groups or gain societal acceptance. Often attributed to
an underdeveloped sense of self, this factor, combined with hormonal and
brain developments, further increases the likelihood that teens will engage
in risky behavior without properly evaluating its impact.2 6
B. The Impact of Psychology on the Law
Due to this powerful combination of brain development, hormonal
changes, and external pressure, juveniles require different treatment under
the law. Standard capacity defenses like insanity and diminished capacity
are ill suited. For instance, the typical legal inquiry for insanity is whether
one knows the difference between right and wrong. Young people know
the difference between right and wrong, but are at times incapable of
deciding to do what they know is right. Hormonal influences create an
emotionally driven brain that, without properly developed reasoning skills,
causes teens to focus on seeking immediate gratification instead of
evaluating consequences or controlling impulses.27
This reward or pleasure-seeking behavior is exemplified by the
prevalence of non-violent juvenile crime, such as property crimes 28 and
teenage pregnancy. In 2008, the Department of Justice reported that, while
violent crime rates for juveniles decreased, juvenile property crime rates
increased, resulting in 493,600 arrests that year.29 As for teen pregnancy,
23 Wallis, supra note 6.
24 See Schad, supra note 22, at 377-79.
25 See id. at 380-81.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 377-78.
28 Property crimes include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
29 Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2008, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION 3 (Dec.
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approximately 750,000 teenagers in the United States become pregnant
each year and 82% of these pregnancies were unintended. 30 Ultimately,
these examples demonstrate that, while a juvenile may know a certain
behavior like stealing someone's property or engaging in unprotected sex is
wrong or dangerous, they may be incapable of resisting their impulses and
properly evaluating the consequences of their actions.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Though findings about juvenile psychological developments are recent,
today any parent or teacher could tell you teenagers are different from
adults. Historically, however, society did not view young people
differently, but believed they were simply smaller versions of adults.
Changes in the societal perceptions of the youth forced the law to adapt and
eventually gave rise to an independent juvenile justice system.
This section discusses the development of the juvenile justice system,
including the creation of juvenile courts and, eventually, juvenile transfer
laws. Part A will address how the juvenile justice system developed on a
national level. Part B will address how the juvenile justice system
developed in New York.
A. Nationwide Development of the Juvenile Justice System
a. Creating Juvenile Courts
Legislators created the juvenile justice system during the late nineteenth
century in response to a dramatic shift in the societal understanding of
children. 31 Previously considered miniature adults, society began to view
children as a special category of societal member.32 New legislation
reflected this change in opinion as legislators passed laws designed to
protect children, such as child labor laws, mandatory education
requirements, and the creation of the juvenile justice system. 33
The first Juvenile Court was created in Illinois in 1899.34 The Juvenile
2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/228479.pdf.
30 Facts on American Teens' Sources of Information About Sex, GUTTMACHER INSTrrTUTE 1 (Feb.
2012), http://www.guttnacher.org/pubs/FB-Teen-Sex-Ed.pdf.
31 See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case
for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083, 1097 (1991).
32 See id. at 1093-94; Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and
Victims: 1999 National Report, NAT'L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERVICE 2 (Dec. 1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/178995.pdf.
33 See Ainsworth, supra note 31, at 1093.
34 See Monya M. Bunch, Juvenile Transfer Proceedings: A Place for Restorative Justice Values,
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Court Act of 1899 created a separate court system in Illinois with original
jurisdiction over juveniles to address children's issues in a non-criminal
proceeding. 35 Other states quickly followed this model and developed their
own similar juvenile courts. 36
Legislators created the juvenile justice system to account for two
generally held beliefs. First, the belief that juveniles are less blameworthy
for their actions than adults, and, second, the belief that the State has an
interest in developing a child rather than simply punishing him.37 Juvenile
courts purported to achieve these goals through three main differences from
criminal courts: (1) the proceedings were separate from those for adult
offenders; (2) parents were involved in the proceedings; and (3) children
were not imprisoned in adult jails. 38
b. Creating Juvenile Transfer Laws
By 1925, only two states lacked a separate juvenile court.39 Though the
original jurisdictional age limit began at sixteen, the success of juvenile
courts encouraged many states to increase this age to eighteen.40 By 2000,
almost every state followed course, and today only New York maintains
the jurisdictional age limit of sixteen.41
As the age limit increased, many legislators believed some juveniles,
particularly those who committed violent offenses, did not deserve such
benevolent and protective care from the State. To address these violent
offenders, the juvenile courts developed a "transfer" system to remove
extreme cases to criminal court.42 For example, today, in any state, a
seventeen-year-old charged with murder would be prosecuted as an adult in
criminal court, rather than prosecuted as a juvenile offender in juvenile
court.
4 3
There are three ways a juvenile can be transferred from juvenile court to
criminal court: prosecutorial waiver, judicial waiver, or statutory waiver.
With prosecutorial waiver, the prosecutor is given discretion to file in
47 How. L.J. 909,914 (2004).
35 See id.
36 See id; Sobie, supra note 3, at 1063 (stating that in 1903 alone, 6 states created their first
juvenile courts).
37 See Bunch, supra note 34, at 914-15; see also Shay Bilchik, Youth Courts: A Chance to Build
Hope, 83 N.Y. ST. B.J. 12, 14 (2011).
38 See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 115-16 (1909).
39 See Sobie, supra note 3, at 1061.
40 See id at 1064.
41 See id
42 See id. at 1065.
43 Id.
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either criminal or juvenile court, as both courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over the case. 44 With mandatory judicial waiver, only the juvenile court has
jurisdiction over the case, so it must waive its jurisdiction in order to
proceed in criminal court.45 With statutory waiver, state law determines the
maximum age of the juvenile court's original jurisdiction and all offenders
above that age are prosecuted in criminal court. 46 Additionally, some states
provide for a reverse waiver where the criminal court may transfer cases
back to the juvenile court.47
Today most states use a combination of these three types of waiver to
govern juvenile offenders. 48 Regardless of the type of waiver, however,
these tools expose juveniles to the risk of prosecution in adult criminal
court.
B. The Creation of the Juvenile Justice System in New York
New York's juvenile justice system developed slowly and was largely
influenced by the public and media perceptions of juvenile criminals.49
Today, it remains one of the harshest states for treatment of juvenile
offenders.50
a. New York's Evolution of the Juvenile Court
New York law generally reflects the belief that children are different
from adults and need to be treated as such under the law. Originally, to
decide eligibility for imprisonment, New York defined juveniles as those
under the age of eighteen.51 In 1824, the New York legislature created the
New York House of Refuge to rehabilitate juveniles instead of sending
them to traditional prisons to be incarcerated with adults.52 Though
juveniles did not have their own court until 1922, previously they were
prosecuted in their own separate part, Children's Court, to promote
44 See Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIM. &
JUST. 81,92 (2000).
45 See id.
46 See id. at 93.
47 See id.
48 Seeid. at 89-92 tbl.1.
49 See Kelly M. Angell, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile Offenders are Treated as
Adults, Nobody Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125, 135 (2004); see also Tracy Rightmer, Arrested
Development: Juveniles' Brains Make Them Less Culpable Than Adults, 9 QUINNIPIAC L.J. 1, 8-9
(2005).
50 Haddad, supra note 5, at 484.
51 See Sobie, supra note 3, at 1067.
52 Id. at 1066.
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separating young offenders from the general prison population.53
Eventually, in 1922, New York followed the national trend and created a
separate juvenile court, the New York State Children's Court, though the
legislature lowered the jurisdictional age limit to sixteen.54
Criticism of the low jurisdictional age limit began shortly after it was
passed, and has remained consistent ever since. In 1931, a New York State
Crime Commission report stated that the stark difference between the
criminal and juvenile courts was unfair to young offenders prosecuted as
adults, considering the arbitrary cut off age prescribed by the legislature. 55
Similar criticism continued and the legislature constantly revisits the issue,
but has never reached a majority consensus to increase the age.
Specifically, the issue has been addressed by the Joint Legislative
Committee on Children's Court Jurisdiction and Juvenile Delinquency in
1942,56 the New York Constitutional Convention in 1961,57 and the
Juvenile Offender Law in 1978.58 Under each treatment legislators failed to
reach a majority consensus to increase the age limit, but always tabled the
issue for further review, often shifting the debate to another committee.59
b. New York's Juvenile Transfer law
As the jurisdictional age limit issue shuffled back and forth between
committees, legislators, and interest groups, a violent juvenile crime wave
in the 1970s provided the legislature with a solid justification to not only
defend the harsh treatment of juveniles, but to increase punishment and
expand its reach.
1. The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976
New York responded to a general increase in juvenile violence with the
Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976.60 One juvenile crime that prompted
53 See id. at 1069.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 1070.
56 See id. at 1071.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 1084.
59 See id. at 1071-72. For example, the Family Court Act of 1962 included the following language:
"This section follows existing law in limiting juvenile delinquency to persons under sixteen years of
age. This decision is tentative and subject to change upon completion of a study of the Youthful
Offender Act and the Wayward Minor Law." Id. at 1072 (emphasis added). That report in turn
concluded with the following statement: "[g]iven [the] ... constitutional mandate to examine again the
question of whether the juvenile delinquency age should be changed or other arrangements made for
dealing with young offenders." Id. at 1072-73.
60 Haddad, supra note 5, at 459.
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the response was the case of two juveniles, ages fourteen and fifteen, who
kidnapped, robbed, assaulted, terrorized, and sodomized two ten-year-old
boys.61 The act passed in a political fury and public outrage after incidents
of juvenile violence received vast media coverage that encouraged the
public to seek harsher punishments for young offenders who committed
heinous crimes. 62 This piece of legislation served as the starting point for
New York's transfer of juveniles from juvenile court to criminal court. 63
The Juvenile Justice Reform Act responded to the people's cry for
harsher punishments for juvenile criminals by creating a list of designated
felonies and prescribing appropriate punishment. 64 For example,' a fourteen
or fifteen-year-old convicted of murder, rape, or arson would be held in
restrictive placement for three to five years. 65 Despite these mandatory
penalties, violent juvenile offenses continued and the process proved to be
insufficient to address the public's concern.
2. The Juvenile Offender Law of 1978
Two years later the New York Legislature imposed even harsher
conditions on juveniles in response to the continued increase in violent
juvenile crimes. 66 Not only did the rate of juvenile violent crime and
homicides double between 1965 and 1980, but individual incidents posed
an alarming disregard for human life. One case in particular raised cause
for concern. In March 1978, a juvenile named Willie Bosket shot three
men, killing two.67 Bosket shot and killed the first man while he was
sleeping on the subway and proceeded to steal the victim's gold watch,
ring, and the money in his pocket. 68 Bosket shot and killed the second man
about a week later also while riding the subway; on this occasion, Bosket
also shot a train yard dispatcher, who survived.69 Because Willie was
fifteen years old, he was prosecuted in the Bronx Family Court System
where his maximum sentence for the two murders was only five years. 70
Additionally, the conviction did not go on Bosket's criminal record.71
61 See id. at 459 n.22.
62 See id. at 456-57.
63 See id. at 457.
64 See id. at 459.
65 See id.
66 See Sobie, supra note 3, at 1075.
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Naturally, an outraged public demanded the young offender receive harsher
punishment, and soon after the legislature responded.72
Given the horrific nature of Bosket's crimes and his young age, the
media followed the incident closely to the verdict.73 To be sure, the
horrible nature of the crimes became distorted in the public perception as
representative of the violent nature of all juvenile crimes and how lightly
the justice system treated juveniles. The excessive media attention, paired
with the general spike in juvenile crime rates, placed tremendous pressure
on the legislature to act. This public outcry shaped the penal nature of the
Juvenile Offender Law of 1978 and removed the treatment of juveniles far
from its rehabilitative beginnings to a retributivist emphasis on punishment.
The Juvenile Offender Law of 1978 created even harsher punishments
for juveniles. 74 The law addressed violent crimes by decreasing the age of
criminal liability and imposing harsher mandatory minimum sentences. For
example, a fourteen or fifteen-year-old convicted of arson would receive a
minimum sentence of four to six years and a maximum sentence of twelve
to fifteen years in a secure facility.75 Additionally, the law restricted plea-
bargaining for all violent offenders, including juveniles. 76
Most importantly, the Juvenile Offender Law mandated that juveniles
charged with crimes would begin their proceedings in criminal court.77
These offenders could only be removed to Family Court at the District
Attorney's discretion in a reverse waiver. 78 In limited circumstances, a
juvenile in criminal court could receive "Youthful Offender Treatment"
that would seal his or her criminal record and prevent the future stigma of a
criminal conviction, but this was rare.79 The law left many juveniles
exposed to the harsh realities of being prosecuted as an adult in criminal
court before the prosecution even established the merits of its case.
New York's transfer law was highly influenced by the political climate,
public outcry, and disproportionate media attention placed on juvenile
72 Id. at 456-57.
73 Id
74 See 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 481.
75 See id § 32 (defining "juvenile offender"); Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing
Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAw & SOC'Y REV.
521, 523-24 (1988), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3053628.pdf7acceptTC--true.
Compare this sentence to the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976 that mandated three to five years of
restrictive placement for a fourteen or fifteen-year-old convicted of arson.
76 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 481.
77 Id
78 Id.
79 Haddad, supra note 5, at 462 (stating that the court considers the circumstances of the crime, the
nature of the offense, the harm to the victim, prior criminal history and recommendation of the
prosecutor and defense counsel).
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violence in the 1970s. The media is generally drawn to cases of juvenile
violence for the same reasons that support more lenient punishment of
juvenile offenders. Violent juvenile crime shocks society because it
challenges the common notion that children are not violent criminals, but
simply do not understand the consequences of their actions. 80
Stories of juvenile violence instill a societal fear that anyone could
become a criminal, or worse, a victim.8 1 One study found newspapers were
27.49%82 more likely to report crimes as the age of the offender decreased
by one year. This age dichotomy becomes important because the public
desire to punish extreme young offenders is misplaced, and, in reality,
legislation is more likely to punish older offenders, such as sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds who are subject to prosecution as adults.
Media reports foster a public perception that overestimates the
prevalence of juvenile crime, even when crime rates are declining.8 3 This
negative perception of juvenile crime rates was present during the 1980s, a
decade that boasted a "get tough on crime" attitude. 84 While states took a
number of different approaches to transfer juveniles into adult courts, New
York took a more extreme approach and remains the harshest state for
juveniles today.8 5
3. The Law Today
Currently, under the New York Penal Code Article 30.00, "a person less
than sixteen years old is not criminally responsible for conduct," subject to
enumerated exceptions.8 6 Exceptions to this general rule impose criminal
liability for those age thirteen or older for murder in the second degree and
felony murder "provided the underlying crime for the murder charge is one
for which such person is criminally responsible or for such conduct as a
sexually motivated felony."87 Exceptions which impose criminal liability
80 See John G. Boulahanis & Martha J. Heltsley, Perceived Fears: The Reporting Patterns of
Juvenile Homicide in Chicago Newspapers, 15 CIUM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 132, 155 (2004); Mike Farrell,
Sixteenth Annual International Law Symposium "Rights of Children in the New Millennium": On the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 21 WHrrrIER L. REv. 207,212 (1999).
81 See Boulahanis & Heltsley, supra note 80, at 155.
82 See id. at 143.
83 See id. at 134 ("A survey accompanying Sprott's study found that almost three-fourths of
respondents tended to overestimate the amount of crime, believed homicides involving juvenile
offenders had increased (while they had actually decreased), and most viewed the juvenile court as 'too
lenient."').
84 Bishop, supra note 44, at 84.
85 See id.
86 N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00 (McKinney 2012).
87 Id.
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for those age fourteen or older include: kidnapping, arson, assault,
manslaughter, rape, criminal sexual acts, aggravated sexual abuse,
burglary, and robbery in the first degree; burglary, arson, and robbery in the
second degree; possession of a firearm on school grounds; attempted
murder in the second degree; kidnapping in the first degree; and sexually
motivated felonies. 88
Teenagers age sixteen or older, or those whose crimes fall within one of
the aforementioned exceptions, are prosecuted as adults in criminal court,
but teenagers under sixteen, whose crimes do not fall within the exceptions,
are prosecuted as juveniles in Family Court. 89
III. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
This section will explore why New York needs to change its juvenile
transfer laws. Part A will discuss how New York's juvenile transfer laws
have failed to meet the goal of decreasing juvenile crime and have actually
increased recidivism rates among juvenile offenders. Part B will discuss
previous attempts to raise the age of criminal responsibility in New York
and posit some factors that may have contributed to its failures, including
cost, reluctance to alter the status quo, misconceptions about juvenile crime
rates, and the general lack of sympathy for the cause. Part C will
demonstrate how the Supreme Court has endorsed advances in juvenile
psychology that support increasing the age of criminal liability. Part D will
state why the current proposed changes to New York's juvenile transfer
laws are insufficient to protect teenagers under the law.
A. New York's Juvenile Transfer Laws Increase Recidivism Rates Among
Juvenile Offenders
Though juvenile transfer laws implemented drastic changes within the
juvenile justice system, the legislature failed to meet its goal to decrease
juvenile crime. While juvenile crime rates have decreased in the past
decade, specifically in the past few years, this cannot be rightly attributed
to the removal procedures enacted by the legislature.
Juveniles prosecuted as adults in criminal court demonstrated higher
recidivism rates than those prosecuted in Family Court.90 The Center for
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 See, e.g., Andrea McGowan et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the
Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult Justice System, 32 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. S7, S14 (2007) (finding, based on empirical evidence, that transferring juveniles
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Disease Control created a task force to explore the deterrent value of
transfer laws.91 All studies yielded negative results.92 One report compared
a group of four hundred juveniles arrested in New York (where the age of
criminal liability is sixteen) and New Jersey (where the age of criminal
liability is eighteen) and found "transferred juveniles were 39% more likely
to be re-arrested on a violent offense than were retained juveniles." 93
Another study yielded similar results when it compared more than two
thousand juveniles prosecuted during 1992 and 1993 in either New York or
New Jersey for aggravated assault, armed robbery, or burglary.94 By 1999,
the study revealed that "youth prosecuted in the adult courts in New York
were 85% more likely to be re-arrested for violent crimes than those
prosecuted in the New Jersey juvenile courts,... and 44% more likely to
be re-arrested for felony property crimes." 95 Clearly, the New York transfer
laws serve little, if any, deterrent value, since recidivism rates are higher
for New York juveniles prosecuted as adults, who were re-arrested faster,
more frequently, and for more serious offenses, as compared to similarly
situated New Jersey juveniles. 96
B. Previous Attempts at Change and Why These Efforts Failed
While there is no clear reason why New York has failed to reduce the
age of criminal liability, a number of interrelated factors may prove
informative: cost, reluctance to alter the status quo, misconceptions about
juvenile crime rates, and the general lack of sympathy for the cause. 97
Opponents have objected to amending juvenile transfer laws due to
cost.98 There is a fear that the already overburdened juvenile justice system
cannot adequately fund the influx of sixteen and seventeen-year-old
to adult court and subjecting them to adult sentences results in higher recidivism rates).
91 Task Force on Cmty Preventative Servs., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating
the Transfer of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5609al.htm.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 See MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice,
The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Adult Criminal Court, 5
ISSUE BRIEF 1, 1 (2006), available at http://www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issuebrief_5.pdf
95 Id.
96 See id. at 2.
97 Similar factors were posited in North Carolina where juveniles were also automatically
transferred into adult criminal court at age sixteen. See Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction, and the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 101, 121-24 (2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 183022.
98 Mosi Secret, Judge Seeks New System for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at A22; see
Birckhead, supra note 97, 121.
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offenders who stand to double the Family Court's caseload if the
jurisdictional age limit is raised to eighteen. 99 This argument, however, is
weakened by the findings in Connecticut and North Carolina, where this
exact change proved successful.100 Despite the upfront cost of funding the
transfer, over time the predicted drop in recidivism rates by prosecuting
juveniles in an appropriate forum actually lowered costs in North Carolina
and Connecticut,101 as both states saw decreases in the number of
prosecutions. 102
Another commonly cited issue is the reluctance to change the status
quo; 103 however, this issue alone cannot justify maintaining the
jurisdictional age limit at sixteen. While it is difficult to change most laws,
this reluctance is outweighed by the overwhelming amount of conclusive
scientific studies that present new evidence warranting a change in the
status quo. Legislators created the status quo for juvenile justice before
researchers could explain the marked differences between adults and
juveniles that make the latter inherently less culpable. Given the severe
implications for juveniles prosecuted as adults, it would be unjust to allow
a reluctance to change the status quo to justify continuing to prosecute
juveniles in an inappropriate forum.
Public perception about juvenile crime rates is another reason cited for
not amending the juvenile transfer laws; 104 however, this public perception
is inaccurate. The statistical data that shows juvenile crime rates are
dropping, and reaching historic lows, cannot be disputed, nor can these
results be rightly attributed to the transfer laws shown to increase, not
decrease, recidivism rates. 105 Though juveniles may be involved in any
number of crimes, murder is an illustrative example, given the seriousness
of the offense and its prominent status as a cause for public concern.
Current juvenile murder arrest rates are decreasing, nearing an all-time
low. 106 While rates peaked in 1993 at 14.4 arrests per 100,000 juveniles, in
2008 this rate dropped to just 3.8 arrests per 100,000 juveniles
99 Secret, supra note 98.
100 See Birckhead, supra note 97, at 118.
101 See id. at 154.
102 See id. at 103, 133; Editorial, Court Reform for Teenage Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011,
at A22 (describing recent efforts to decrease juvenile recidivism in New York).
103 See Birckhead, supra note 97, at 121.
104 See id. at 107.
105 See Task Force on Cmty Preventative Servs., supra note 91 (reviewing research on effects of
transferring juveniles to adult justice system and finding no evidence of general deterrence).
106 See Charles Puzzanchera & Benjamin Adams, Juvenile Arrests 2009, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. &
DELINQ. PREVENTION 9 (Dec. 2011), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236477.pdf.
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demonstrating a 74% decrease in fifteen years. 107 This demonstrates that
the crime wave that prompted the legislature to "get tough on crime" and
ensure public safety from juvenile offenders simply no longer exists. The
fear of juvenile criminals is fabricated and should not be permitted to keep
real juvenile offenders from receiving appropriate treatment in a juvenile
court.
Finally, this proposed change has been met with apathy, and at times
resistance, because it is simply an unsympathetic cause. 108 While juveniles
differ from adults in very real ways that make them less culpable, that does
not change the fact that they committed serious crimes against innocent
people. Unsympathetic, however, must not be translated into unworthy.
The proposed amendments are still necessary and would actually benefit
the larger public by reducing recidivism and decreasing crime rates in
general.
C. How New Psychology Applies to Juveniles Today
As noted above, scientists' knowledge about the teenage brain has
advanced tremendously over the past decade. A juvenile's brain is less
developed than an adult's brain, specifically in areas that control logic,
reasoning, risk-analysis, and foreseeing consequences. For example, in one
study where adult and juvenile participants rated the likelihood of certain
risky events occurring and the consequences of risky behaviors such as
drinking alcohol, using fireworks, or vandalizing property, juveniles
overrated the likelihood of these events occurring but underrated the
possibility of negative consequences. 109 While scientific evidence is always
under scrutiny in the law due to its ever changing nature, in the past decade
the Supreme Court has endorsed these specific psychological
advancements in, not one, but three groundbreaking cases.
a. Roper v. Simmons Holds Juveniles Are Different.
In Roper v. Simmons,110 the Supreme Court held that the death penalty
was a cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment
107 Puzzanchera, supra note 29, at 1.
108 See Birckhead, supra note 97, at 124; Jessica Wilde, Juvenile Criminals Must be Prosecuted as
Adults, REBEL YELL (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.unlvrebelyell.com/2009/03/05/juvenile-criminals-
must-be-tried-as-adults/.
109 See B.J. Casey et al., Risk Taking and the Adolescent Brain: Who is at Risk?, 10
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F8, F 13 (2007) (finding that, in a study of individuals aged seven to twenty-nine,
impulse control continues to develop over the course of adolescence and early adulthood).
110 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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when applied to juveniles (which the Court defined as those under the age
of eighteen) because, simply put, juveniles are different.II" The Court
articulated three major differences between juveniles and adults to justify
its hard line exclusion. First, juveniles demonstrate a lack of maturity and
responsibility commonly found in adults.112 Second, juveniles are more
susceptible to peer pressure and other outside influences. 113 Third,
juveniles exhibit an underdeveloped character that can change over time. 114
The Court harped on this point and the rehabilitative potential of juveniles
stating,
[t]he reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it
is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed
by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a
moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a
minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a
minor's character deficiencies will be reformed. 115
Clearly, the Supreme Court recognized the principle that juveniles are
different.
The Court supported its opinion with the growing national trend to
exclude juveniles from the death penalty and the amicus briefs from
various psychological associations supporting the proposition that juveniles
are different. When looking to national trends, the Court found that a
majority of states, thirty out of fifty, prohibit the juvenile death penalty and
thus concluded that the majority rule should be extended nationwide.116
The Court also relied on various assertions made in amici briefs by the
American Psychological Association (APA) and the American Medical
Association (AMA). The APA's brief stressed the transitory nature of
juveniles, which experts believe to be so unpredictable that professionals
refuse to diagnose those under eighteen with severe disorders, such as
personality disorders. 117 This ultimately became an important factor for the
Court, finding that juveniles who were not in control of their actions and
demonstrated a true likelihood of changing their behavior over time could
not properly be held criminally responsible in the same manner as an adult.
11 Id. at 569.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See id. at 570.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 564.
117 Brief for the American Psychological Association & Missouri Psychological Association as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19-20, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2007) (No. 03-633).
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The AMA's brief, while providing more specific explanations about the
physical brain development,"l 8 supported the APA's propositions that
juveniles make emotional, as opposed to rational, decisions and will likely
grow out of their criminal behavior.' 19
b. Graham v. Florida Reaffirms Juveniles Are Different
In Graham v. Florida,120 the Court reiterated the logic from Roper in
holding that sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of
parole for a non-homicide offense also violated the Eighth Amendment.121
The Court again looked to national trends and the psychological differences
between juveniles and adults to conclude that juveniles are different and
thus deserve different treatment under the law.122 The scientific findings
from Roper were found to be just as relevant in 2010 when the Court stated
the "developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,"123 even citing
the APA and AMA briefs for support that "parts of the brain involved in
behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence."124 The
Court noted that juveniles are mentally underdeveloped and, therefore,
inherently less culpable than adult criminals. 125
c. Miller v. Alabama Extends the Principle that Juveniles Are Different
In Miller v. Alabama,126 the Court extended the holding in Graham to
prohibit mandatory sentences to life without the possibility of parole for
118 See Brief of the American Medical Association et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 12-20, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2007) (No. 03-633) (summarizing the structural changes in
a juvenile's brain including the dominance of the amygdala, which controls emotional impulsive
responses, and the delayed maturation of the pre-frontal cortex, which controls reasoning and weighing
risks/rewards in decision-making).
119 Seeid. at5-8,22.
120 130 S.Ct.2011 (2010).
121 See id. at 2034.
122 See id.; see generally Kristin Rhodes, The Criminal Prosecution of Juveniles: A Philosophical
Reappraisal of Adolescent Agency, LETHBRIDGE UNDERGRADUATE RES. J. (2008),
http://www.lurj.org/article.php/vol3n2/juveniles.xml.
123 See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026 ("[Plarts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to
mature through late adolescence. Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions
are less likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably depraved character' than are the actions of adults."
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2007))).
124 Id. at 2026 (citing Brief for American Medical Association et. al. as Amici Curiae at 16-24,
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412); Brief for American Psychological
Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 22-27, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412)).
125 See id.
126 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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juveniles for all crimes. 127 Again, citing the same differences articulated in
Roper and Graham, the Court stated that an individualized determination
was required before imposing such a harsh sentence on a juvenile. 128 The
Court compared sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of
parole to sentencing an adult offender to the death penalty, given the likely
duration of the sentence, the juvenile's young age, and the transient nature
of a juvenile's character that promoted change.129 Inadequate juvenile
transfer laws were cited as a contributing source to the impositions of
inappropriate sentences. "Because many juvenile systems require that the
offender be released at a particular age or after a certain number of years,
transfer decisions often present a choice between extremes: light
punishment as a child or standard sentencing as an adult." 130
1. Applying Roper, Graham, and Miller to New York's Juvenile
Transfer Laws
Though Roper, Graham, and Miller addressed the Eighth Amendment
and dealt with juvenile sentencing post-trial, the same logic can be applied
to the decision to prosecute a juvenile as an adult. In each case, the Court
made two inquiries: (1) what is the national trend and (2) does science and
psychology support the proposition that juveniles are different.
Evaluating the New York jurisdictional age limit under these two
inquiries is simple. The national trend is explicitly clear; New York is the
only state treating all sixteen-year-olds as adults in criminal proceedings.
Though Connecticut and North Carolina only increased their jurisdictional
age limits recently, 3 1 the national trend strongly favors treating children
under the age of eighteen as juveniles, and now New York remains the only
hold out. Science and psychology also clearly support the proposition that
juveniles are different for many of the same reasons endorsed by the Court
itself. The most recent studies still indicate that teenagers are inherently
less culpable due to their underdeveloped brains and possess a transient
character that requires different treatment under the law.
D. Why the Current Proposed Changes Are Inadequate
Under the current New York law, anyone age sixteen or older who
127 Id. at 2460.
128 See id. at 2460.
129 See id. at 2467-69.
130 Id. at 2474.
131 See Sobie, supra note 3, at 1081.
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commits a crime is prosecuted as an adult in criminal court. 132 In addition,
those age fourteen or older will be prosecuted as an adult for kidnapping,
arson, assault, manslaughter, rape, a criminal sexual act, aggravated sexual
abuse, burglary or robbery in the first degree, or arson or robbery in the
second degree. 133 Finally, those age thirteen or older are considered adults
in criminal court for murder in the second degree and felony murder where
the offender would be criminally liable for the underlying felony or if the
felony is sexually motivated. 134
New York is currently reviewing a number of proposed amendments to
increase the age of criminal liability to eighteen and expand the number of
exceptions placing young offenders in adult criminal court. The first
proposed amendment would simply raise the age of criminal liability from
sixteen to eighteen.135 The next proposed amendment would expand the
underlying felonies to support a felony murder charge for fourteen and
fifteen-year-old offenders by including not only completed crimes for
which the juvenile would be criminally responsible, but also attempts to
commit such crimes. 136 A series of proposed amendments would permit
juveniles to be prosecuted as adults for a number of additional crimes. 137
Proposed amendment 1037 would prosecute thirteen-year-olds as adults for
rape, criminal sexual acts, and aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree
and fourteen and fifteen-year-olds for aggravated sexual abuse in the
second and third degrees.138 Proposed amendment 2827 would hold
fourteen and fifteen-year-olds liable for criminal possession of a weapon in
the third degree, manslaughter in the second degree and an attempt to
commit any of the previously enumerated exceptions. 139 Proposed
amendment 4034 would make fourteen and fifteen-year-old offenders
liable for strangulation140 and, under proposed amendment 6466, gang
assault in the first degree, aggravated assault upon a police officer or a
peace officer, and sexual conduct against a child in the first degree. 141
The current proposals will not provide adequate protection for juveniles.
132 N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00 (McKinney 2012).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See Assemb. 6355, 2011 Leg. 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
136 See Assemb. 1037, 2011 Leg. 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
137 See id.; Assemb. 2827, 2011 Leg. 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011); Assemb. 4034, 2011 Leg. 234th
Sess. (N.Y. 2011); Assemb. 6466, 2011 Leg. 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
138 See Assemb. 1037.
139 See Assemb. 2827.
140 See Assemb. 4034.
141 See Assemb. 6466.
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The proposed amendments to New York Penal Law Article 30.00 would
increase the age of criminal liability to eighteen, but greatly expand the list
of crimes that would bring juveniles straight to criminal court. 142 While
each crime objectively seems to belong in an adult criminal court, the
cognitive limitations of the juvenile offenders who commit these crimes
must not be ignored. Clearly, the legislature is taking steps to protect some
juveniles by proposing to raise the jurisdictional age limit, but expanding
the list of exceptions still poses the same risk of harm to a greater number
of underage offenders.
IV. PROPOSAL
This final section presents a proposal for the New York legislature to
adopt to ensure that juveniles, particularly those who are sixteen or
seventeen years old, are adequately protected under the law. Part A will
discuss the proposal and its four critical components. Part B will explain
how the proposal can be successfully implemented gradually over a five-
year trial period. Part C will apply the proposal to the hypothetical of John
and Derek encountered in the introduction.
A. The Proposal
There are four critical components to this proposal. First, the New York
legislature should increase the age of criminal liability from sixteen to
eighteen and prosecute all persons under the age of eighteen in Family
Court. Second, the District Attorney should be able to petition for serious
offenses to be removed to criminal court at the Family Court's discretion.
Third, the Family Court's sentencing power should be extended, permitting
it to sentence according to judicial discretion. Finally, the Family Court's
jurisdiction should be extended from twenty-one-year-olds to twenty-five-
year-olds.
a. New York Should Increase the Age of Criminal Liability from Sixteen
to Eighteen
The New York legislature should increase the age of criminal liability
from sixteen to eighteen and prosecute all persons under the age of
eighteen in Family Court. As experience and advances in psychological
research demonstrate, sixteen and seventeen-year-old brains are
142 See Assemb. 6355.
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underdeveloped and limited in their ability to reason, make decisions, and
accurately assess the future consequences of their actions. As a group,
juveniles are inherently less culpable and it is improper to evaluate them by
the same standards as fully developed adults.
While science indicates the brain is fully developed closer to age twenty-
five, delaying criminal liability by nearly a decade goes too far. Eighteen
provides a more suitable age to impose criminal liability, as this is the age a
juvenile gains many decision-making capabilities, including the right to
vote and enlist in the military. Delaying criminal liability to age eighteen is
an appropriate compromise between recent psychological findings and
political considerations.
b. The District Attorney May Petition the Family Court to Remove
Extreme Cases
For particularly heinous offenders or crimes, the District Attorney should
retain the power to petition the Family Court for a waiver to prosecute
these unique juveniles as adults in criminal court. The Family Court would
decide if the case should be removed, considering the nature of the crime,
the manner in which the crime was committed, the nature of the offender
(as determined from psychological reports, parental reports, school reports,
etc.), previous juvenile adjudications, the age of the offender, the age of the
victim, and any other extenuating circumstances the court or District
Attorney deems appropriate.
This proposal preserves prosecutorial discretion to seek adult
punishment and imposes the retributivist features of the adult criminal
court, but limits this power with the Family Court judges' expertise in
dealing with juvenile offenders. As Family Courts would hear all criminal
cases for those under eighteen, its judges would possess a unique
perspective in evaluating whether a juvenile should be prosecuted as an
adult. Additionally, the Family Court judges would be more insulated from
political pressure and public outcry in the wake of violent juvenile crime.
This would allow the Family Court to impartially determine if adult
prosecution is appropriate for the juvenile without the constraints of
political pressure.
c. Family Court Sentences Should be Determined by Guidelines
The New York legislature should expand the sentencing power of the
Family Courts to accommodate the more violent crimes the court would be
likely to address with sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders previously
20141
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prosecuted in criminal court. Currently, the Family Court may only
sentence a juvenile to five years in a secure facility, regardless of the crime
committed, and offenders must leave the facilities at age twenty-one. To
address this issue, the five-year limit should be eliminated and the Family
Court should be permitted to sentence according to judicial discretion (as
informed by guidelines modeled after adult criminal sentencing
guidelines) 143 so long as decisions are justified with reasoning in a sealed
written opinion.
Merely extending the sentencing power of the court to impose harsher
sentences would be insufficient under this proposal that contemplates more
serious crimes being prosecuted in Family Court. 144 To adequately address
the public's common critique that the Family Court is too lenient on
juvenile offenders, a large motivating factor in creating juvenile transfer
statutes in the first place, the Family Court must be able to sentence
offenders in the same way as a criminal court. This will provide juveniles
with a fair adjudication before a court that is familiar with their cognitive
limitations, but also satisfy the publics' well-founded desire that dangerous
offenders be removed from the general population. While the focus of the
proceedings should remain rehabilitative, this extension would provide the
court with the power to impose harsher sentences for more heinous crimes
and alleviate the public critique that juvenile courts are too lenient.
d. Family Court's Jurisdiction Should Extend to Age Twenty-Five
Offenders adjudicated under the Family Court's sentencing power should
remain under the treatment of the juvenile system until age twenty-five,
when researchers estimate brain development is complete and the offender
may properly be evaluated as a culpable adult. Sentences that extend past
an offender's twenty-fifth birthday should be reevaluated at that time to
determine the best method to fulfill the remaining sentence: probation, a
mental health facility, or transfer to an adult prison.145 There are two
143 See, e.g., N.Y. SENTENCING CHARTS, CHART II (2009); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5C1.1 (Nov. 2011).
144 Though under this proposal many of the more serious crimes, such as murder, would be
removed to criminal court, other serious offenses, such as burglary, would likely remain in Family
Court, creating a genuine need to increase its sentencing power beyond five years. Additionally, some
murder cases may remain in Family Court, in which case imposing a five-year sentence presents the
same problem faced in the Willie Bosket case.
145 This reevaluation would not consider the merits of the adjudication or extend the sentence
beyond the original sentence prescribed. The reevaluation would assess where the offender should
spend the remainder of the sentence consistent with other legal considerations such as due process.
Missouri already utilizes an almost identical system where juvenile offenders serve a juvenile sentence
in a secure facility until age twenty-one at which point a judge decides whether to release him outright,
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reasons for this reevaluation: first, to ensure the offender is receiving
adequate treatment that a juvenile facility may not be able to provide, and
second, to ensure the safety of other juvenile offenders from the dangers
associated with being housed in an adult prison.
Rehabilitation should be the primary goal of these juvenile facilities, 146
and the subsequent standard for either early release or reevaluation at age
twenty-five. As the Supreme Court noted on multiple occasions, the
character of a juvenile is transient, making him susceptible to change over
time. 147 This presents the perfect opportunity for rehabilitative efforts that
could correct criminal tendencies and transform the juvenile from a
criminal to a productive member of society.
A committee, comprised of mental health professionals, members of the
court, and state representatives, would evaluate rehabilitation according to
progress in mental health sessions in the facility, good behavior, statements
from the offender, and any other factors deemed relevant. If the offender
has demonstrated true rehabilitative success, the committee would suggest
probation, but if the offender has not demonstrated a successful
rehabilitation, the committee would recommend transfer to either an adult
prison or a mental health facility. The Family Court would review all
committee recommendations and issue a final decision on the record.
B. Implementation
This proposal should be enacted on a five-year trial basis during which
time it should not be subject to legislative amendments. This time is
necessary to truly test the effectiveness of the system, since these laws are
often rashly amended following isolated and sensationalized incidents of
juvenile crime to "protect" the public against a perceived threat. A
committee of judges, district attorneys, child psychologists, and other
similar constituents should be assembled to reevaluate the program
annually for the five-year trial and make any necessary changes. The
legislature would review the entire system at the end of the trial period and
evaluate the merits of the program, deciding to amend it or establish it
place him on probation, or send him to adult prison.
146 Neither deterrence nor retribution can be a valid goal for the Family Courts or juvenile
transfers. Deterrence cannot be a valid goal, since multiple studies have shown juveniles lack the
cognitive capacity to foresee future consequences of their actions, a crucial skill to make deterrence
effective. Retribution is not an appropriate goal, since neurological studies demonstrate juveniles are
inherently less culpable for the crimes they commit due to their underdeveloped brains that present
unique challenges to reasoning, decision-making, and impulse control.
147 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2004); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
368 (1993).
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permanently. This trial period would allow the program to grow with rapid
adjustments suggested by informed members of the committee, but also
insulate the system from rash legislative actions and public resistance.
A significant concern with this proposal will be funding. Like the recent
jurisdictional increase in Connecticut, this financial concern can be
addressed through gradual implementation with a one-year age increase of
the Family Court's jurisdiction, until it reaches eighteen. 148 In fact,
Connecticut and North Carolina have both predicted that prosecuting
juveniles in Family Court will save money, as these adjudications cost less
than an adult criminal prosecution. 149 Additionally, if funding remains a
challenge, funds saved from the adult criminal court system no longer
prosecuting these juvenile offenders could be reallocated to the Family
Court to offset any upfront costs of the change and the increasing operating
cost of these juvenile adjudications. This would alleviate some of the
financial stress on the juvenile system and afford juvenile offenders
adequate protection under the law.
C. John and Derek's Outcome Under the New Proposal
Applying this proposal to the hypothetical of John and Derek from the
introduction yields a very different result. Recall, John and Derek were
involved in a physical altercation after a soccer game. Under New York's
juvenile transfer law John (sixteen years old) was prosecuted as an adult,
which led to serious consequences such as one-year probation and a
criminal record, while Derek (thirteen years old) was prosecuted as a
juvenile and received community service but no criminal record.
Under this proposal, where the age of criminal liability is increased from
sixteen to eighteen, both John and Derek's cases would be adjudicated in
Family Court. The boys would likely receive the same charges and
punishment for engaging in the same behavior rather than the vastly
different punishments imposed by the current law simply due to the boys'
respective ages.
Though this hypothetical posed only a minor infraction, if it posed a
more serious offense the new proposal would still yield a different result
from the current law. Suppose during the altercation Derek fell and hit his
head on a rock, resulting in death. While this would increase the severity of
the crime, this proposal would still permit the case to be adjudicated in
148 See Birckhead, supra note 97, at 103.
149 Id. at 118.
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Family Court, unless the District Attorney successfully petitioned to have
the case removed. If the case remained in Family Court, the court would be
able to impose an appropriate sentence due to the elimination of the five-
year sentence maximum. Additionally, if the sentence required, John could
remain under the Family Court's jurisdiction until age twenty-five as
opposed to the current age of twenty-one. John's treatment in the juvenile
system would provide him a real chance at rehabilitation rather than
subjecting him to the harsh realities of being prosecuted as an adult in
criminal court.
CONCLUSION
The legislature created and developed the juvenile justice system over
the past century to ensure courts adequately addressed the marked
differences between juveniles and adults. Moving forward, science and
psychology provided proof that this instinct was correct and that the law
truly should adhere to the notion that juveniles are different. New York
remains the last state to prosecute all juveniles as adults at age sixteen and
it is time for the legislature to catch up to the national trend of treating
juveniles as juveniles. New York must amend its juvenile transfer laws by
increasing the jurisdictional age limit from sixteen to eighteen, prosecuting
all offenders under the age of eighteen in the Family Courts, removing only
extreme cases upon petition by the District Attorney and approval of the
Family Court, increasing the sentencing power of the Family Court to
accommodate more violent cases and extending its jurisdiction to age
twenty-five. By making these recommended changes New York can return
from the bitter to the sweet side of sixteen.
2014]

